BENEDICTO S. AZCUETA, G.R. No. 168414
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
LA UNION TOBACCO REDRYING
CORPORATION (LUTORCO),
FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL
TRADING CORPORATION (FATCO),
FIELDMAN TRUCKING CORPORATION
(FTC), SEE LIN CHAN, KAMBIAK Y.
CHAN a.k.a. JOHN CHAN JR. and Promulgated:
TITA C. YABUT,
Respondents. August 31, 2006
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This
petition for review[1] on
certiorari assails the September 27, 2004 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83270 which set aside the January 12,
2004 Decision[3] and
January 31, 2004 Resolution[4] of
the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31 in Civil Case No. A-2225,
permanently enjoined the enforcement of the November 22, 2002 Decision[5] of
the Municipal Trial Court of Aringay, La Union in Civil Case No. 483; and its
June 7, 2005 Resolution[6]
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
La Union Ventures, Inc. (LUVI) owns several
parcels of real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-37318,
T-37319, T-37320, T-37321 and T-372322, where the corporation’s main office, as
well as the offices of respondents La Union Tobacco Redrying Corporation
(LUTORCO), Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation (FATCO), Fieldman Trucking
Corporation (FTC), and the residence of See Lin Chan, Kambiak Y. Chan a.k.a.
John Chan Jr. and Tita C. Yabut are located.
It appears from the records that the subject
properties were for a time owned by respondent LUTORCO but were later transferred
to LUVI on
Thus, on
On
LUVI alleged that it is the owner of
the subject properties; that it allowed respondents to use the main gate of its
compound to give them access to their offices and residence; that on April 25,
1997, respondents illegally acquired possession and control of LUVI’s land and
buildings through intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth; that respondents
replaced LUVI’s security and detective agency with their own; and that
respondents repainted the gate of the compound with the logo “LUTORCO.”
Respondents argued that LUVI’s
ownership over the properties is in dispute; that petitioner has no legal
capacity to sue in behalf of LUVI; that respondents acted as officers and
agents of LUVI in taking over the subject properties; and that the company’s physical
possession of the properties was never disturbed.
In the forcible entry case, respondents
also raised the issue of jurisdiction. They
claimed that the controversy is intra-corporate in nature as it involves a
dispute between stockholders of LUVI, hence the same falls within the jurisdiction
of SEC. Petitioner on the other hand, argued
that at the time respondents took over LUVI’s properties, they were not
stockholders, officers or majority stockholders of the corporation. Petitioner also averred that the allegations
in the complaint clearly show that the action filed is a possessory action and
not an intra-corporate controversy.
On
Thus, the Municipal Trial Court proceeded
with the trial of Civil Case No. 483.
On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby render IN FAVOR OF Plaintiff LA UNION VENTURES, Inc. (LUVI),
AND AGAINST ALL Defendants, ordering them:
1. To vacate the properties described in
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-37318, T-37319, T-37320, T-37321, T-37322,
including all the structures and improvements found therein; and to peacefully
turn over the same to PLAINTIFF LUVI.
2. To pay the PLAINTIFF the amount of
THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P382,492.50) a month, as reasonable compensation for the use,
enjoyment and occupancy of the LUVI Compound commencing in May 1997 until they
have completely vacated the premises.
3. To pay attorney’s fees in the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00).
SO
ORDERED.[13]
LUVI moved for the execution of the
said decision on
In the meantime, LUVI allegedly underwent
a change in management and elected new directors and officers. On
Dear Judge Jaravata,
This
is in connection with the above-entitled case which was decided on
We
would like to reiterate and emphasize that the possession over the subject
premises has always been with LUVI and has never been disturbed. The occupancy of the lessees had always been
lawful and authorized by LUVI. Attached
are the certification of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as (to)
the members of the board and officers of LUVI and the Resolution ratifying the
acts and lease contracts entered into by LUVI thru its administrator FATCO.
All
issues with the defendants had been settled internally. The result thereof shall be properly
accounted to the other stockholders in the proper proceedings and forum where
the CDF group which fraudulently controlled over (sic) LUVI should also be made to account for the books of LUVI as
well as the record of [i]ts transaction with our group.
Very Truly
Yours,
(Sgd.) Julie
C. Dyhengco
Respondents filed a manifestation/comment,
citing the letter and arguing that execution of the decision in the forcible
entry case was no longer feasible.[17] In
support thereof, respondents attached a Certificate of Corporate
Filing/Information[18] issued
by SEC and LUVI’s General Information Sheet dated January 30, 2003,[19]
showing that respondents are stockholders of the corporation and that petitioner
Azcueta has ceased to be an officer. Respondents
also filed a motion to withdraw their Motion to Post Supersedeas Bond.[20]
In a resolution[21]
dated
The motion for reconsideration and/or
motion to quash writ of execution was denied in a resolution[22]
dated
On
In a decision dated
Respondents moved for reconsideration
and inhibition, but both were denied on
Consequently, petitioner filed before
the Municipal Trial Court a Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Writ of
Execution with Prayer for Satisfaction by Levy dated February 10, 2004.[24] The court issued a writ of execution dated
March 31, 2004[25] again requiring
respondents to vacate the subject properties and to pay LUVI reasonable
compensation for the use, enjoyment and occupancy of its properties.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition[26]
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83270. They asserted that execution of the November
22, 2002 Decision in Civil Case No. 483 must be stayed in view of the change in
management of LUVI which constitutes a supervening event.
On June 21, 2004, the Court of
Appeals granted respondents’ prayer for a temporary restraining order of the Municipal
Trial Court’s decision.[27]
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 01-99719
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, a notice of dismissal was
also filed by Baltazar, purportedly in behalf of LUVI. On August 30, 2004, the trial court rendered
a decision[28] nullifying
respondents’ acts as officers and directors of LUVI, and permanently enjoining
them from further representing or misrepresenting themselves as such. The court
likewise denied Baltazar’s notice of dismissal and ruled that his authority to
represent LUVI is unfounded, stating that:
Hence, this Court hereby declares as null
and void any and all acts performed or done by the defendants or any other
person or persons acting in their behalf, either in their alleged capacities as
directors or officers of LUVI or otherwise, in relation to the representation,
use, administration, control and management of the assets and properties of
LUVI from the time they took over the LUVI compound on April 25, 1997 up to the
present.
The
defendants are also hereby enjoined from: (1) representing or misrepresenting
themselves to be the directors or officers of LUVI; (2) usurping the functions
of the legitimate directors and officers of LUVI; (3) performing any act for
and in behalf of LUVI or in relation to any of the properties of LUVI,
including but not limited to the use, administration, control and management of
assets and properties of LUVI; and (4) interfering in the business and
operations of LUVI.
x x
x x
The
Court is in receipt of a Notice of Dismissal dated July 8, 2004, purportedly
filed by the plaintiff LUVI. Allegedly,
LUVI president Francisco Willy Baltazar filed the said Notice. As the records and evidence presented in this
case show, Mr. Baltazar is a
representative of the Defendants and not of the Plaintiff. Thus he cannot rightfully ask for the
dismissal of this case as the alleged representative of LUVI. x x x.[29] (Emphasis added)
On September 23, 2004, petitioner
filed an Urgent Manifestation[30]
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83270 to inform the court of the Regional
Trial Court’s decision. Petitioner moved
for the dismissal of respondents’ appeal considering that the trial court had
declared null and void LUVI’s change in management and effectively mooted the
issue on supervening event.
However, on September 27, 2004, the Court
of Appeals granted respondents’ petition for certiorari and prohibition and
reversed and set aside the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo
dated January 12, 2004 and January 31, 2004. The Municipal Trial Court of Aringay was
permanently enjoined from enforcing its November 22, 2002 Decision in Civil
Case No. 483. The Court of Appeals held:
The
case at bar comes within the purview of the latter exception, which necessitates
a departure from the general rule on immediate execution of decisions in
forcible entry cases. Verily, after the
issuance of the MTC’s November 22, 2002 Decision, material facts and
circumstances supervened which brought about a material change in the situation
of the parties. This is evident from the
letter emanating from LUVI itself, informing the MTC that the issues involved
in the case had already been settled “internally” and that LUVI, per Board
Resolution No. 2003-02-A, had ratified petitioners’ contract of lease. As likewise confirmed by LUVI in the same
letter addressed to the MTC, possession over the subject premises had always
been with it, had never been disturbed and the occupancy thereof by the
petitioners had always been lawful and authorized. Clear from these facts and circumstances is
LUVI’s intention to waive the benefits of the subject MTC Decision. This intention was made more evident by
LUVI’s intervention in favor of the petitioners, through its newly designated
general manager and representative, Willy Baltazar (“Baltazar”), in the case
for annulment of the March 10, 2003 and April 8, 2003 Resolutions of the MTC.
The
authority of LUVI’s newly elected Officers and Board of Directors is supported
by the General Information Sheet dated
In
the same vein, there is no compelling urgency for the execution of the MTC’s
Decision in this case considering LUVI’s express waiver of such execution and
its admission that possession of the subject premises had never been disturbed
even during the pendency of the case.[31]
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for review on certiorari raising
the following issues:
1.) WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED “SUPERVENING
EVENT” MATERIALLY CHANGED THE SITUATION OF THE PARTIES TO BAR THE EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT IN THE FORCIBLE ENTRY SUIT [CIVIL CASE NO. 483].
2.) WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED “SUPERVENING
EVENT” SHOULD HAVE BEEN THRESHED OUT IN AN INTRA-CORPORATE PROCEEDING, NOT
THROUGH A CERTIORARI SUIT.
Petitioner contends that the decision
of the Municipal Trial Court of Aringay in Civil Case No. 483 must be enforced. He maintains that the only issue in the
forcible entry case is possession and that the issuance of a writ of execution
in the said case is proper. Further, he
argues that the issue on the alleged supervening event is intra-corporate in
nature and has been resolved by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46 in
Civil Case No. 01-99719.
Petitioner insists that he is the duly
authorized representative of LUVI by submitting a copy of the minutes of an organizational
board meeting[32] held on
June 15, 2005, during which the board of directors reiterated his authority to
represent LUVI, as well as the General Information Sheet[33]
of the corporation filed with SEC on June 30, 2005, showing that he still holds
the position of corporate secretary.
Respondents argue that petitioner has
no legal personality to file the instant petition. They claim that, by virtue of the election of
a new board of directors for LUVI, petitioner’s authority as corporate
secretary had been effectively removed; that petitioner is not a real party in
interest and has lost his standing to institute the present action; that the change
in management of LUVI is a supervening event which bars the execution of the
November 22, 2002 Decision; and that the Municipal Trial Court of Aringay and the
Regional Trial Court of Agoo had jurisdiction to rule on the supervening event.
The petition is meritorious.
The core issue in this case is whether
the alleged supervening event – the change in management of LUVI which resulted
in an internal settlement between the parties – bars the execution of the
November 22, 2002 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Aringay in Civil
Case No. 483.
In Silverio, Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc.,[34] we held:
The
court may stay immediate execution of a judgment when supervening events,
occurring subsequent to the judgment, bring about a material change in the
situation of the parties. To justify the stay of immediate execution, the
supervening events must have a direct effect on the matter already litigated
and settled. Or, the supervening events
must create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties
which would render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or
inequitable making it imperative to stay immediate execution in the interest of
justice.
In the instant case, we do not find
any material change in the situation of the parties which justifies a further
delay of execution, let alone a permanent injunction. The change in management of LUVI does not
constitute a supervening event which renders inequitable the immediate execution
of the
Time and again, this Court has ruled
that the only issue for resolution in forcible entry cases is material
possession or possession de facto of
the properties involved.[36] Moreover, said cases are summary in nature as
to provide an expeditious means of protecting the right to possession of the
property. In Joven v. Court of Appeals,[37] we held:
The philosophy
underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by strong hand, violence, or terror.
In affording this remedy of restitution, the statute seeks to prevent
breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which might ensue from the
withdrawal of the remedy. Another
purpose is to discourage those persons who, believing themselves entitled to
the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate
action in the courts to assert their claims.
It is settled that LUVI, in whose
name the subject properties are titled, has the right to possession over the
subject properties. Respondents have
been adjudged as having no right to take over and occupy the said properties. Upon judgment, execution should have
immediately ensued in accordance with law.
Even granting for the sake of
argument that the change in management was a supervening event, it has been
declared void in Civil Case No. 01-99719 before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 46 which has jurisdiction over the same as it involves a dispute
among stockholders of the corporation. To
write finis to the controversy, we deem
it necessary to take judicial notice of the proceedings therein. It has been held that a court may consult
decisions in other proceedings, in order to look for the law that is
determinative of or applicable to the case under review. In some instances, courts have also taken
judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the
matter in controversy. These cases “may
be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke” a rule of
judicial notice.[38]
In its
The
authority of Baltazar to file the notice of dismissal was allegedly based on
Board Resolution No. 2004-19 adopted by the board members of LUVI, whereby as
the president of LUVI, he was authorized to sign, execute and deliver any and
all documents relative to the withdrawal and dismissal of Civil Case No.
01-99719. If we are, however, to trace the circumstances that led to the alleged
election of Baltazar as the president of LUVI, it is evident that such election
can be attributed to the acts of the respondents-stockholders in the case
below, which acts were precisely among the ones complained of and sought to be
enjoined in the petition for injunction.
The same thing goes with the subsequent grant of authority upon Baltazar
to file the notice of dismissal.
x x
x x
In the instant case, the public respondent denied the subject notice of
dismissal precisely because Baltazar’s authority to file the notice was not
recognized by plaintiff LUVI. On the
contrary, the filing was opposed by the plaintiff. As has been previously discussed by this
Court, the conclusion that he was, instead, representing the defendants is a
logical conclusion that could be deduced from the circumstances attending the
instant case.
Moreover,
with the trial court’s finding that the representatives
of the plaintiff in the case below were the legitimate officers and directors
of LUVI, and that the defendants were mere usurpers of the functions of these
officers and directors, it had sufficient ground to deny the notice of
dismissal. x x x The fact that the acts
performed by the defendants were annulled by the trial court therefore renders
the supposed authority of Baltazar unfounded, for it was these acts performed
and resolutions issued by these defendants that ultimately led to the assumed
authority of Baltazar. In view of
all these, we find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the trial court in denying the notice of dismissal.[40] (Emphasis
added)
Baltazar, in behalf of LUVI, filed a petition
for review on certiorari but was denied by this Court in a resolution dated
It is clear therefore that respondents’
theory must fail considering that the sole basis for the same has been struck
down. There was no valid change in
management and, consequently, no supervening event to speak of that would
justify a stay of execution. The letter
from Julie C. Dyhengco is a mere scrap of paper as she was not a duly elected
officer of LUVI. Similarly, Baltazar’s
intervention cannot be considered an express waiver on the part of LUVI because
his appointment as the corporation’s new representative was nullified.
In view of the foregoing, the
permanent injunction granted by the Court of Appeals has lost all factual and
legal bases and must be lifted. As it were, the execution of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 483 has been delayed for more then three years. Therefore, possession of the subject
properties must be immediately restored to LUVI through its representative, herein
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 83270 dated September 27, 2004 and its June 7, 2005 Resolution
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 12, 2004 Decision and
The decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Aringay dated November 22, 2002 in Civil Case No. 483 ordering the
respondents to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for its
use is immediately executory and the assailed order of the Municipal Trial
Court dated March 10, 2003 and its resolution dated April 8, 2003, for the
issuance of a writ of execution are likewise AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-24.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
MTC records, pp. 776-777.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, p. 65.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
CA rollo, pp. 122-132.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo, pp. 66-69. Penned by
Presiding Judge Ethelwolda A. Jaravata.
[22]
[23]
[24]
CA rollo, pp. 270-273.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[32]
[33]
[34]
G.R. No. 143312,
[35] Chua v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 262, 271 (1997).
[36] Rivera v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154203,
[37]
G.R. No. 80739,
[38] Bongato v. Malvar, 436 Phil. 109, 118 (2002).
[39] Rollo, pp. 377-386.
[40]
[41]